AID-I-003: Quarantine & Throttling of AI Interactions
Control families: child controls separate detection-driven quarantine and safe mode, identity/session/API throttling, resource-token-spend budget throttling, and per-action containment before side effects. This split reflects real engineering ownership: SecOps/SOAR, API gateway, platform/FinOps, and agent orchestration teams.
Scope boundary
Owns reversible response-time containment after a detection, policy, health, trust-state, or budget signal crosses a containment threshold. It translates existing findings into bounded quarantine, degradation, rate limiting, budget throttling, or per-action enforcement; it does not compute the signal or perform durable eviction.
AID-E-002: AID-I-003 applies reversible quarantine, safe mode, throttling, or action containment; AID-E-002 revokes execution leases and terminates confirmed-compromised runtime processes, jobs, pods, and containers. Use this family for bounded containment while investigation or recovery proceeds, and E-002 when the incident decision requires authoritative live-execution eviction.
AID-I-005: AID-I-003 contains a scoped identity, session, tenant, agent, budget, or action; AID-I-005 applies a last-resort system-wide or tenant-wide halt or severe restriction. A local quarantine or throttle is not proof that the emergency halt propagated across every required execution boundary.
AID-E-001: AID-I-003 applies reversible quarantine, safe-mode downgrade, or throttling while investigation and recovery proceed; AID-E-001 authoritatively revokes compromised credentials, sessions, principals, issuance paths, and delegated grants after an incident decision. A quarantine receipt cannot prove durable identity-plane eviction, and revocation does not replace bounded containment of the affected workload or action.
Sub-techniques
Threat mappings
MITRE ATLAS
- AML.T0024.002 Exfiltration via AI Inference API: Extract AI Model
- AML.T0029 Denial of AI Service
- AML.T0034 Cost Harvesting
- AML.T0034.000 Cost Harvesting: Excessive Queries
- AML.T0034.001 Cost Harvesting: Resource-Intensive Queries
- AML.T0034.002 Cost Harvesting: Agentic Resource Consumption
- AML.T0040 AI Model Inference API Access
- AML.T0046 Spamming AI System with Chaff Data
- AML.T0053 AI Agent Tool Invocation
- AML.T0086 Exfiltration via AI Agent Tool Invocation
- AML.T0096 AI Service API
- AML.T0101 Data Destruction via AI Agent Tool Invocation
- AML.T0126 Automated Collection
MAESTRO
- Model Stealing (L1)
- Denial of Service on Data Infrastructure (L2)
- Denial of Service on Framework APIs (L3)
- Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks (L4)
- Resource Hijacking (L4)
- Model Extraction of AI Security Agents (L6)
- Compromised Agents (L7)
- Agent Tool Misuse (L7)
- Agent Pricing Model Manipulation (L7)
OWASP LLM Top 10 2026
- LLM02:2026 Sensitive Information Disclosure
- LLM03:2026 Excessive Agency
- LLM06:2026 Unbounded Consumption
- LLM07:2026 Misinformation
OWASP ML Top 10 2023
- ML05:2023 Model Theft
OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026
- ASI02:2026 Tool Misuse and Exploitation
- ASI03:2026 Identity and Privilege Abuse
- ASI08:2026 Cascading Failures
- ASI10:2026 Rogue Agents
NIST Adversarial Machine Learning 2025
- NISTAML.014 Energy-latency
- NISTAML.031 Model Extraction
- NISTAML.039 Compromising connected resources
Cisco Integrated AI Security and Safety Framework
- AITech-2.1 Excessive Agency
- AITech-9.1 Model or Agentic System Manipulation
- AITech-12.1 Tool Exploitation
- AITech-13.1 Disruption of Availability
- AITech-13.2 Cost Harvesting / Repurposing
- AISubtech-2.1.1 Execution Approval Bypass
- AISubtech-4.3.4 Replay Exploitation
- AISubtech-9.1.2 Unauthorized or Unsolicited System Access
- AISubtech-9.1.3 Unauthorized or Unsolicited Network Access
- AISubtech-13.1.1 Compute Exhaustion
- AISubtech-13.1.2 Memory Flooding
- AISubtech-13.1.3 Model Denial of Service
- AISubtech-13.1.4 Application Denial of Service
- AISubtech-13.2.1 Service Misuse for Cost Inflation
- AISubtech-14.1.2 Insufficient Access Controls
- AISubtech-18.2.1 Abuse of APIs for Mass Automation
Google Secure AI Framework 2.0 - Risks
- MXF: Model Exfiltration
- DMS: Denial of ML Service
- MRE: Model Reverse Engineering
- RA: Rogue Actions
Databricks AI Security Framework 3.0
- Model Management 8.2: Model theft
- Model Serving - Inference requests 9.7: Denial of Service (DoS)
- Model Serving - Inference response 10.5: Black-box attacks
- Agents - Core 13.2: Tool Misuse
- Agents - Core 13.3: Privilege Compromise
- Agents - Core 13.4: Resource Overload
- Agents - Core 13.13: Rogue Agents in Multi-Agent Systems