AID-M-006.002: HITL Operator Qualification & End-to-End Readiness Testing
Pillars: app
Lifecycle: validation
Scope boundary
Owns technical qualification of the complete assigned operator roster and signed end-to-end readiness drills over approval, denial, timeout, escalation, override, recovery, and observed terminal-action branches. It is not general awareness training.
AID-M-006.001: AID-M-006.002 proves that assigned operators and the end-to-end control path can execute the defined branches; AID-M-006.001 defines the checkpoint, role, evidence, and procedure to be exercised. Procedure documentation is not operator qualification, and a drill must test the approved procedure rather than invent a new checkpoint.
AID-M-006.003: AID-M-006.002 exercises and measures the complete human and technical path; AID-M-006.003 defines the canonical escalation topology and audit-event contract used to judge that path. A successful drill consumes the contract but does not become the owner of event semantics or escalation routing.
Implementation guidance
- AID-M-006.002-G001: Develop comprehensive operator training with realistic simulations and measurable outcomes.
- AID-M-006.002-G002: Automate regular HITL fire drills to validate end-to-end readiness.
AID-M-006.002-G001
Purpose and boundary
This step defines operator qualification against a signed training and scenario population. A trainee name, UI response, completion badge, or scenario owner boolean is not assurance evidence; the verifier recomputes results from authenticated raw response events.
Define the qualification contract
# File: hitl/schemas/operator-qualification.schema.yaml
schema_version: aidefend.hitl-operator-qualification-schema.v1
required_bindings:
checkpoint_release_digest:
type: string
pattern: "^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$"
operator_roster_receipt_digest:
type: string
pattern: "^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$"
training_content_digest:
type: string
pattern: "^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$"
scenario_manifest_digest:
type: string
pattern: "^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$"
policy_required_fields:
- policy_id
- policy_version
- policy_digest
- role_to_required_modules
- role_to_required_scenarios
- scoring_algorithm
- qualification_thresholds
- freshness_policy
population_required_fields:
- roster_record_id
- operator_subject
- assigned_roles
- primary_or_backup
- assignment_effective_at
- assignment_expires_at
- revocation_status
- required_module_ids
- required_scenario_ids
raw_response_required_fields:
- attempt_id
- operator_subject
- scenario_id
- scenario_version
- presented_at
- response_at
- response
- expected_decision_digest
- proctor_or_platform_identity
- authentication_context_digest
- execution_receipt_id
- event_signature
result_states:
- PASS
- FAIL
- INSUFFICIENT_DATA
- NOT_APPLICABLE
- ERRORResolve modules, scenarios, scoring, response-time requirements, and recertification windows only from the signed readiness policy. Reconcile the signed roster snapshot to the current identity directory, reject expired or revoked assignments, and include every primary and backup operator plus every missed, abandoned, duplicated, late, stale, or errored attempt. A scenario answer key must be separately controlled from the trainee-facing system.
Action: Sign an operator-by-scenario qualification matrix only after an independent verifier authenticates events, recomputes scores and timing, and reconciles the exact roster, module, and scenario populations.
AID-M-006.002-G002
Purpose and boundary
This step proves that each production HITL checkpoint and escalation branch works end to end. Do not let the checkpoint API assert its own success or let a caller supply an expected_result; derive expected branches from signed policy and observe delivery, decision, timeout, and closure through an externally controlled event stream.
Define the drill and observation contracts
# File: hitl/schemas/fire-drill-contract.schema.yaml
schema_version: aidefend.hitl-fire-drill-schema.v1
required_bindings:
checkpoint_release_digest:
type: string
pattern: "^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$"
escalation_policy_digest:
type: string
pattern: "^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$"
operator_roster_receipt_digest:
type: string
pattern: "^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$"
drill_manifest_required_fields:
- drill_run_id
- checkpoint_id
- branch_id
- synthetic_request_digest
- expected_event_types
- expected_route_subjects
- timeout_behavior
- policy_version
required_branch_types:
- approve
- deny
- timeout
- unavailable_primary
- backup_escalation
- override
- recovery
- interface_error
- observed_final_action
- malformed_request
observed_event_required_fields:
- drill_run_id
- checkpoint_instance_id
- event_id
- event_type
- actor_subject
- route_subject
- action_id
- action_digest
- authorization_outcome
- observed_effect
- occurred_at
- payload_digest
- source_identity
- event_signature
result_required_fields:
- expected_branch_count
- observed_branch_count
- missing_event_ids
- extra_event_ids
- duplicate_event_ids
- late_event_ids
- effective_timeout_action
- gate_receipt_digest
- observed_final_action
- observed_final_outcome
- resultSchedule and freshness are policy-owned. The independent verifier reads the signed drill manifest, current role directory, provider delivery receipts, and externally held lifecycle events; it derives branch expectations only from the exact checkpoint policy, reconciles every checkpoint-by-required-branch member, correlates stable checkpoint instance IDs, and confirms the effective timeout, override, recovery, interface-error, gate, and observed-final-action outcomes. Notification delivery alone does not prove that the checkpoint blocked the action or honored the decision.
Action: Produce a detached-signed drill receipt for every checkpoint and required branch. Missing, late, duplicate, self-reported, or unverifiable events prevent readiness PASS.
Open-source tools
- Apache Airflow
- Prefect
- Kubeflow Pipelines
- Grafana
- Kibana 8.16+ AGPLv3 source build
- Alerta
- Prometheus Alertmanager
Commercial / hosted tools
- PagerDuty Operations Cloud
- xMatters
- Immersive Labs
- RangeForce
- Palo Alto Networks Cortex XSOAR
- Splunk SOAR
Threat mappings
MITRE ATLAS
- N/A
MAESTRO
- N/A
OWASP LLM Top 10 2026
- N/A
OWASP ML Top 10 2023
- N/A
OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026
- ASI09:2026 Human-Agent Trust Exploitation
NIST Adversarial Machine Learning 2025
- N/A
Cisco Integrated AI Security and Safety Framework
- AISubtech-2.1.1 Execution Approval Bypass (Independently drills approval, denial, timeout and override through the observed final action)
- AITech-2.1 Excessive Agency (Independently drills approval, denial, timeout and override through the observed final action)
Google Secure AI Framework 2.0 - Risks
- N/A
Databricks AI Security Framework 3.0
- Model Management 8.3: Model lifecycle without HITL (human-in-the-loop)
- Agents - Core 13.10: Overwhelming Human in the Loop
- Agents - Core 13.15: Human Manipulation