AID-R-003.001: Post-Incident Identity & Session Re-establishment

Version 1.20261015 · Actionable sub-technique

Create new trusted interactive sessions only after incident-scoped credential and session eviction, fresh policy-required reauthentication, and a new identity-provider readback.

Pillars: infra, app

Lifecycle: improvement

Scope boundary

Owns creation and independent verification of new trusted interactive sessions after required eviction and reauthentication. It does not revoke prior credentials, tokens, grants, or sessions and does not restore conversational state or privileges.

AID-E-001: AID-R-003.001 creates a new trusted interactive session; AID-E-001 evicts the compromised credential, token, session, principal, or grant population. This recovery control consumes verified AID-E-001 results and cannot treat successful new authentication as proof that old authentication and authorization objects were revoked.

Implementation guidance

AID-R-003.001-G001: Require MFA or step-up authentication for every applicable restored interactive session under the authority-signed recovery policy.

AID-R-003.001-G001

Require MFA or step-up authentication for every applicable restored interactive session under the authority-signed recovery policy.

Purpose and boundary

Use this identity-provider integration reference architecture to verify that every applicable restored interactive session was created only after the policy-required MFA or step-up event and is bound to a fresh post-reset authentication context. It does not rotate workload credentials or prove authorization for tools.

Sign the session-reset and authentication policy

The identity recovery authority signs the incident, tenant and application scope, exact affected-principal and revoked-session population, reset cutoff, allowed factor and assurance classes, required token claims, IdP tenant/policy versions, exempt non-interactive identity classes, evidence freshness, and exception policy. Factor strength and reauthentication windows come only from that versioned policy.

# File: recovery/contracts/session-step-up-policy.yaml
schema_version: aidefend.r003.session-step-up-policy.v1
required_bindings:
  - system_or_tenant
  - incident_id
  - recovery_release_id
  - reset_cutoff_at
  - affected_principal_manifest_digest
  - revoked_session_manifest_digest
  - idp_policy_digest
  - allowed_factor_classes
  - required_acr_values
  - required_amr_rules
  - exception_policy_digest
receipt_required_fields:
  - expected_principal_count
  - observed_principal_count
  - expected_new_session_count
  - verified_new_session_count
  - nonconforming_session_ids
  - unmeasured_principal_ids
  - result

Enforce and retain evidence

Configure MFA/step-up at the IdP or authorization server, not by trusting an application header. Consume and independently verify AID-E-001's exact closed eviction receipt for the pre-cutoff session population, then require a fresh authentication transaction, validate issuer, audience, signature, nonce, auth_time, acr, and amr, then issue a new session under a recovery release identifier. The owner retains signed policy exports, revocation receipts, authentication events, token-claim digests, exceptions, counts, and a detached-signed result in retention-locked evidence; do not retain raw factors or reusable tokens.

Independent readback

A read-only verifier outside the IdP-policy owner trust domain derives the expected principals from the signed population, reads revocation and authentication events directly from the IdP, verifies a policy-defined complete new-session population, and performs positive/negative login tests for every applicable assurance branch. Dependencies are the signed affected-principal/session manifests, IdP trust roots, enforceable policy, trusted time, complete authentication telemetry, and evidence storage. Revocation success is input eligibility, never this guidance's PASS.

Action: authorize restored interactive sessions only from independently verified post-reset IdP evidence; a successful application login alone is not MFA proof.

Open-source tools

Keycloak
FreeIPA
authentik

Commercial / hosted tools

Microsoft Entra ID (refresh-token revocation and policy-driven reauthentication; application-issued session revocation remains external)
Okta Workforce Identity
Auth0
PingOne for Workforce

Threat mappings

MITRE ATLAS

AML.T0012 Valid Accounts (fresh sessions are issued only after AID-E-001 eviction and policy-required reauthentication)
AML.T0091 Use Alternate Authentication Material (new sessions replace evicted alternate authentication material)
AML.T0091.000 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token (fresh issuance follows incident-scoped token eviction)
AML.T0091.001 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie (fresh issuance follows incident-scoped server-side session eviction)

MAESTRO

Agent Identity Attack (L7)
Agent Impersonation (L7)
Lateral Movement (L4) (fresh post-eviction sessions prevent reuse of compromised interactive sessions for lateral access)

OWASP LLM Top 10 2026

OWASP ML Top 10 2023

OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026

ASI03:2026 Identity and Privilege Abuse (fresh trusted sessions replace evicted compromised interactive sessions)

NIST Adversarial Machine Learning 2025

Cisco Integrated AI Security and Safety Framework

AISubtech-14.1.2 Insufficient Access Controls

Google Secure AI Framework 2.0 - Risks

Databricks AI Security Framework 3.0

Agents - Core 13.9: Identity Spoofing & Impersonation (clean identity re-establishment prevents continued impersonation)